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A language of objects and artifacts 




This is a conceptual inquiry about materiality. It gives an introductory overview to the vocabulary of materiality in a chosen selection of theories. The paper shows a language of artifacts and objects as it is used within practice-based approaches to organizational knowing. The examined intellectual traditions are interpretive-cultural approaches; activity theory; and sociology of translation. Similarities and differences are presented in the way these three distinct intellectual traditions conceptualize the array of material objects and artifacts which are central in the tales of practice. 

The paper looks into the mediatedness of knowing and doing in organizations. The intellectual traditions which are scrutinized all agree that ‘doing’ is materially embedded – that objects and artifacts are central to both knowing and learning. But what is their understanding of materiality? With which concepts do the theories attempt to grasp tools and design objects – furniture, graphics, flutes-in-making and built space?

The paper shows which concepts are used and it demonstrates how the interaction between social and material realities are viewed. Furthermore it highlights some of the ontological and epistemological assumptions which can be traced from the distinct conceptualizations – ranging from materialist ontologies to interpretivist epistemologies. The contribution of the paper is an overview of vocabularies of materiality within a selected specimen of practice-based approaches, and thus it contributes to the further development of the conceptual understanding of the tangible, embedded, embodied, artifactual and object-related side of organizational knowing.

The vocabulary is theoretically generated and is based on the anthology “Knowing in Organizations – A Practice-Based Approach” edited by Nicolini, Gherardi &Yanow. In its cross-reading the paper explicitly focuses on the material sides of practice, where the primary concepts found are those of artifact and object.


Practice-based approaches all agree that knowing and doing in an organization is contextual and materially embedded. Tools and other material aspects of ‘doing’ are central to organizational actors, to activity and to knowledge. Practice-based approaches provide a theoretical vocabulary which enables thought about knowing, learning and organizing “as social, processual, materially and historically mediated, emergent, situated, and always open-ended and temporary in character.” (Nicolini, Gherardi &Yanow 2003, p.26)

This paper wants to portray the materially mediated part of this quote. The aim of the paper is to conceptually explore the relationship between what in broad terms may be labelled sociality and materiality. It seeks to answer questions such as: what concept is used to represent ‘materiality’; how is the interaction between ‘materiality’ and social processes of knowing and doing viewed; which role does materiality play in relation to action – does it for example stabilize or destabilize?

PRACTICE-BASED APPROACHES 
AND A NEW MATERIALISM
The interest raised in this paper for ‘materiality’ is echoed in what some call ‘a new materialism’ which explores artifactuality and material culture (Pels, Hetherington & Vandenberghe 2002). An growing interest in ‘thingness’ and materiality has emerged in the past decades as an interdisciplinary endeavour involving anthropologists, archaeologists, art historians and philosophers - among others. By exploring the social life of things, going to ‘the things themselves’ and seeking to understand the effects which they have on human activity, it is possible to spark new energy into, and perhaps “alter the terms of classical debates about idealism vs materialism, realism vs constructivism, agency vs structure, or essentialism vs fluidity and difference.” (Pels, Hetherington & Vandenberghe 2002, p.5). These discussions tie in with modernist vs postmodernist considerations about the relationship between form and content (Ølholm 2001, p.19, Alvesson 2002). ‘New materialist’ notions are also echoed in organization studies, which historically have focused on how people make things, but which also encompass ‘how things make people’ – how objects mediate social relationships, and ultimately how objects can be read as having a form of agency of their own (Pratt & Rafaeli 2006, Strati 2006).

Developing a vocabulary which explicitly is oriented towards the material aspects of social practice may contribute with new understanding of organizational life. Analysing the material side of organizations; things, artifacts, buildings and bodies, may be a useful source of knowledge - as it has been pointed out for decades by symbolists and other interpretors of culture (Gagliardi 1990, 1996; Strati 1999, 2006). Further understanding the agentive – and other – effects of these materialities; understanding how artifacts and objects participate and contribute to organizational processes may change the ways we conceive of and try to arrange organization.

A SELECTED SPECIMEN
This paper focuses on a cluster of texts gathered under the umbrella of  ‘a practice-based approach’ in one specific book: “A practice-based approach to knowing in organizations”, edited by Nicolini, Gherardi and Yanow,  and published in 2003. The texts which are scrutinized in this paper are by Yanow (cultural interpretive), Strati (cultural interpretive/aesthetics), Engeström et.al (activity theory), Gherardi and Nicolini (sociology of translation) and Suchman (sociology of translation). This paper does not examine the whole body of work by these authors, but touches down on single texts published in one common anthology. In a few places points from other texts by the same authors are included and in a few places other contributors from the same intellectual tradition are mentioned. To focus on one single text from extensive lists of publication of course has weaknesses; critique and discussion of the perspectives provided by the authors happens not on the basis of their complete body of work, but on what they have chosen to write in one specific text, at a certain time and in a certain context.

'KNOWING IS DOING'  AND OTHER COMMON FEATURES 
OF PRACTICE-BASED APPROACHES
Within a practice-based approach knowing is closely related to doing, to action or activity. Knowledge and learning is locally produced, emergent, situated and activity-​[1]​ and practice-bound (Mønsted 2000; Lave 1991; Blackler 1993, 1995, 2000, 2003; Sutton 1999; Cook & Brown 1999; Wenger 1998). 

Common for the represented traditions, and central to a practice-based approach is that organizational knowing is seen “as situated in the system of ongoing practices of action in ways that are relational, mediated by artifacts, and always rooted in a context of interaction. Such knowledge is thus acquired through some form of participation, and it is continually reproduced and negotiated; that is, it is always dynamic and provisional.” (Nicolini, Gherardi &Yanow 2003, p.3) Knowing in this sense, is basically about doing. About doing work. This implies a conceptualization of knowledge as a process, as opposed to understandings of knowledge as a substance, a commodity or a piece of information.​[2]​

Five general features of a practice-based theoretical repertoire are: 1) That it “conjures up a world that is always in the making” (Nicolini, Gherardi & Yanow 2003, p.22). This implies focusing on what people actually do: talking about and looking at action, and using verbs to describe it. 2) An interest in the social aspects of knowing and learning: placing processes of knowing not in the mind of the individual but in a social subject. This distances these approaches from cognitivism. 3) It gives voice and interest to the ‘unorderly’, using terms such as uncertainty, conflict and incoherence. 4) It sees knowledge as situated in a spatio-temporal context​[3]​, and finally, 5) the theories use a range of ‘object terms’, “referring to material artifacts as well as to specific historical conditions” (Nicolini, Gherardi & Yanow 2003, p.22).

It is this range of “object terms referring to material artifacts” which this research paper delves into. 

DOING IS MATERIALLY MEDIATED – BUT HOW?
Practice-based approaches provide a unique focus on the mediatedness of knowledge and on its tacit forms. They talk about ‘mediated action’ and tell stories that are social and material; stories about flutes, rooves, bridges, crops, pots and pans. All of these things are “active ‘characters’ in the stories of organizing that constitute the chapters of this book”, write Gherardi et.al. and continue: “Unlike in other approaches, here these artifacts do not play a merely background role. On the contrary, they participate actively in the stories, carry history, embody social relationships, distribute power, and provide points of resistance.”(Nicolini, Gherardi &Yanow 2003, p.22f.)

The approaches which gather under the umbrella of ‘practice’, and whose contributors all agree on the mediatedness of knowledge, have distinct conceptualizations of how the mediatedness happens. They write stories of the role and importance of material objects, their construction and use, but there are subtle differences in the vocabularies that they employ, as there are more profound differences in their ontological and epistemological levels. 

This paper looks into what ”mediated by artifacts” means, what are artifacts and how do they mediate?​[4]​ 
An important goal for this text is to answer these questions, to look into to which degree the answers from each of these traditions supplement and/or contradict each other, and thus - to scrutinize various concepts and understandings of the material in the stories of practice.

To this we proceed.

MATERIALITY -WHAT? 
Within the selected texts the two most common concepts used to give name to the physical, material world are those of objects and artifacts, with the difference between the two being that objects are physical entities​[5]​ and artifacts may be both physical and immaterial. All of the contributions at one point or another use these two terms. These, thus, are the common concepts of materiality in practice-based approaches to organizational knowing.

Cross-reading the texts, there truly is a long list of terms at play: stable artifacts, nonhuman elements, materials, materializations, materiality, nonhuman actors, nonhuman objects, technological artifact, material artifact, object, intermediary artifact, natural object, tool, thing, instrument, object of work, object of activity. Many of the terms are from sociology of translation. The other perspectives generally use fewer terms. The cultural-interpretive and aesthetic approach primarily uses the terms (physical) artifact or object. In activity theory, materiality is represented in the form of (physical) tools and as (physical) objects of activity.

PRIMARY TERMS USED
intrerpretive aestheticobjectartifact	activity theoryobject of activitytool	sociology of translationobjectactantmaterial entityartifact


Below follows a presentation of the words and understanding of materiality within each of the traditions. First Yanow and Strati as representatives of the cultural-interpretive and aesthetic tradition; then Engeströms activity theory; and ultimately the sociology of translation with references to Suchman, Gherardi & Nicolini, and Law.

YANOW
AND THE CULTURAL-INTERPRETIVE APPROACH
Yanow uses the concepts of ‘physical artifact’ or ‘object’ to represent material reality in a social context. Artifact is a term which covers both material and immaterial phenomena; artifacts may be language, acts and objects, and the category also includes values, beliefs and feelings (Yanow 2006, p.37).​[6]​ Objects are “the physical artifacts we create in organizational (and other) contexts and vest with meaning and through which we communicate collective values, beliefs and feelings. Among physical artifacts are the spaces in which words are spoken and read and in which organizational members act and interact, as well as the objects that populate these spaces, to which words refer and that acts engage.”(Yanow 2006, p.42) 

Yanow​[7]​ narrows the material side of social reality down, quite pragmatically, and in line with her epistemological interpretive approach: by empirical definition.​[8]​ Physical artifacts are always related to people, to the meaning they assume to people, and in the analysis of physical objects/artifacts, the categories of analysis are defined empirically, by context, trade and tradition. In one article the artifacts/objects of analysis are ‘flutes’. In another article, the analysis concerns ‘built space’. Yanow writes: “as the category of organizational objects is quite large, the discussion will treat primarily one element: built space. The methods discussed here lend themselves to the study of other objects (and, indeed, also to acts and language), but little attempt will be made to extend the discussion to them more broadly.” (Yanow 2006, p. 43)

In this interpretive approach, social and material realities are seen as closely linked. Objects may be the focus of acts, and they (and other artifacts) may have site-specific meanings to actors. Artifacts may be acted on, and people may be in interaction with them. A practice is seen as “a set of acts and interactions involving language and objects”, and these acts and and interactions are repeated over time, they have patterns and variations. (Yanow 2003, p. 34)

MORE INTERPRETATION: STRATI AND AESTHETICS
Strati also uses the term artifact, but he also mentions terms such as physicality and corporeality (Strati 1999). Artifacts may be physical and tangible objects, but even when they are physical and tangible, writes Strati, they “are not static, immutable, or determinable once and for all; on the contrary, constructionist, phenomenological, and interactionist analyses have shown the extent to which they are mutable and constantly selfinnovative” (Strati 2006, p.24). “In short, at the beginning of this new millennium, organizational artifacts depict contemporary Western societies as some sort of “postsocial environment” (Knorr Cetina, 2003) in which they mediate the social relations among people to an ever-increasing extent, and in which they themselves transmogrify into transmutational objects, ” writes Strati (2006, p.23f.)
Grasping for a vocabulary with which to talk about ‘materiality’, the concept provided by the aesthetic approach is; physical and tangible artifacts which are mutable and constantly emerging anew.

ENGESTRÖM AND ACTIVITY THEORY
In activity theory the central concepts which have to do with material reality are tools and object of activity. Tools are both technology, procedures and language. Tools, along with rules and division of labour mediate activities. Object of activity is a concept which also may be both material and immaterial. It is something which activities are directed at, for instance an object in the making.

Engeströms model of ‘activity systems’ sets the agenda for this approach. The model shows the relations between object-oriented activity, agents, and the community of which they are a part. “Objects of activity are partly given and partly emergent. Engeström suggests (a) that the relations between individuals and the object of their activity are mediated by concepts and technologies, (b) that the relationships between the community and the overall object of its activity are mediated by its division of labour, and (c) that the relations between individuals and the communities of which they are a part are mediated by rules and procedures. Such factors comprise an interrelated bricolage of material, mental, social, and cultural resources for thought and action.” (Blackler et.al. 2003, p.128). Material reality in this perspective is presented as context, and as elements of a physical outer world, which may assume a mediating role and may be the objects which actions are directed towards.

SUCHMAN, GHERARDI & NICOLINI 
- AND LAW: SOCIOLOGY OF TRANSLATION
Sociology of translation​[9]​  conceptualizes of material reality with a range of terms; natural object, artifact, actant, boundary object, materials, materializations, material circumstances. Material entities are treated as the “missing masses” (Latour 1992) from analyses of organizational phenomena. (Strati 2003, 2006, p.23). 

The primary concept used within this approach is actant. A fundamental being that no a priori distinction should be made between human and non-human actants. The term actant is from semiotics, and this intellectual tradition is about “the ruthless application of semiotics,” which points out “that entities take their form and acquire their attributes as a result of their relations with other entities.”(Law 1999, p.3)

Material entities in this approach are participants in social action, as are human beings, and as such they should not be ‘excluded’ from having their role described. Materials are central to social ordering and materials in themselves are seen as effects of knowing and of ordering. Suchman analyzes a specific type of material ordering – the building of a bridge – and demonstrates how the construction of what she calls “a stable artifact” takes place through processes of “heterogeneous engineering”, that is processes of making orderly relations between heterogeneous entities: humans and non-humans, public policies and tangible materials. Gherardi and Nicolini demonstrate how a certain materiality – the improved design of a cement mixer – is part of a larger translative and relational network of safety practices, and how these safety practices are both socially and materially constructed.

In both chapters material entities are viewed as participants and effects of material and social processes. Rather than look at the humans on one side and the non-humans on the other, approaches from within the sociology of translation examine how heterogeneous entities are linked.

THE QUESTIONS OF 
ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
The traditions of a cultural-interpretive inclination stress the interpretive(!), meaning-making processes of encounters with objects. Within this tradition, it is not likely to find mention of ‘objective’ characteristics of artifacts. Strati mentions, that a thing, a chair for instance, does have an ‘ontological determinant’, an essential characteristic in its functionality – it is made for sitting on - but he further argues that this essence quite rapidly becomes uninteresting. According to Strati what instead determines the quality of the chair is aesthetic, the human sensory perception of the chair and the judgment of its aesthetic qualities. Strati argues that ontology (function) does not account for the complexity of the organizational artifact, nor for the complexity of the object.

Yanow is a bit more unclear on the issue of ontology. On the one hand, Yanow writes of built spaces as having certain qualities, for instance that spatial elements may have their own ‘language’ and may usefully be described by using design vocabularies such as descriptions of height, width, mass and scale, materials, color etc., and on the other hand, she stresses that no meaning resides within the artifact. Yanow writes: “the language I have used here may seem, at times, either to suggest that buildings speak for themselves or to attribute to them the meanings intended by their “authors” (founders, executives, architects) alone. I have written, for example, “buildings convey”, when what I mean is, “the buildings comprise elements that their designers intended to use to convey” or “users and passers-by interpret these spatial elements to mean…” (Yanow 2006, p.59f.)

This quote clearly expresses epistemological interpretivism, but also poses a dilemma of vocabulary. Yanow chooses to use sentences which lead to reader-assumptions​[10]​, that she is using ‘objectivist’ ways of describing the characteristics of a building, for example as regards scale, materials etc. The mismatch between the language used and the interpretive frame opens up for considering whether ‘meaning’ suffices as what we draw upon, when we seek to describe physical objects, buildings for instance.​[11]​ It seems to me, that this may be a case of reductionism; to say that there are no properties or qualities to a thing, which may fruitfully described without talking about meaning, and even worse: that ‘meaning’ captures everything there is to say about a physical object. Points made by activity theory about instrumentalities and sociology of translation about functional effects seem to be relevant categories to consider as well, if we are seeking to describe ‘a thing’.

In contrast to Yanows ‘ontological (social) constructionism’, (Yanow 2006, p.44) are the more materially inclined perspectives of activity theory and the more (‘relativist’) ‘objectivist’ sociology of translation. Within these two approaches, the use of the word ‘object’ is more common. Activity theory may be labelled a ‘functional materialism’ (Blackler 2003), and where interpretive approaches as their central line of inquiry have what meaning do people make of the thing, this approach looks into how the human subject is shaped through social and material experience. (Blackler 1995, Spender 1996). Material reality is seen as central to the development of human subjects. It is through engagement with the outer world that learning and development occur. In activity-theory human conduct is seen as object-oriented activity, a central thought being that the object (which may be both material and immaterial) is already implicitly contained in the very concept of activity. Tools are the devices (material and immaterial) which mediate activities, and the instrumentalities of these tools are important. The central concepts which may represent material entities (tools and object of activity) also contain immaterials like language. There is no explicit vocabulary for material objects, but material objects are included as objects of activity and as mediating tools.

Sociology of translation explicitly focuses on materiality, and on tracing how stable material arrangements come to be. Objects are seen as relationa  effects. This implies that the understanding and description of an object is achieved by tracing its relations to other entities, and these entities may be human and non-human. Within this perspective there is no a priori distinction between different entities - or actants. They may be human or artifactual, material or discursive. Using John Law’s words this may be labelled a relational materiality (Law 1999, p. 4). Nicolini and Gherardi call it a ‘socio-material constructionist approach’. Attempting to categorize ‘sociology of translation’ ontologically and epistemologically gives quite a lot of words to chose from. Fuglsang gets to do the dirty job: “it is something as special as a constructivist, objectivist/realist, relativistic, non-rationalist theory.” (Fuglsang 2004, p.435, my translation).

EPISTEMOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY
intrerpretive aesthetic-ontological (social) constructionism-epistemological interpretivisim	activity theory-functional materialism	sociology of translation-relational materialism-socio-material-constructivist, objectivist/realist, relativistic, non-rationalist

MATERIALITY -
HOW DOES IT PARTICIPATE IN DOING?
As pointed out earlier materiality basically participates in doing by mediation. Action is materially mediated. We now will look more closely into this; in which manner do the distinct intellectual traditions conceptualize the relationship between materiality and doing; in which ways do objects/artifacts participate? We will look at the key terms of symbolization, embodiment, object-oriented activity, mediation and alignment.

SYMBOLIZATION
In Yanows work two processes are in focus: symbolization and embodiment. Symbolization regards “the symbolic (representational) character of the relationship between artifacts and their embodied meanings”, writes Yanow and continues: “This entails an analytic focus on meaning: what values, beliefs, and/or feelings an artifact represents beyond any “literal”, nonsymbolic referent.”(Yanow 2003, p.37) The first part is clear; looking into symbolization implies to develop an understanding of what values, belies and/or feelings an artifact represents to a person or to several people, (depending on whose meanings we are interested in). The second part is unclear, what is this, which “an artifact represents beyond any “literal”, nonsymbolic referent”? This is not explained further in the text. 

EMBODIMENT
As regards embodiment artifacts (material and immaterial) are seen as “embodying the intentions (or “mind” or “consciousness”) of the creators of the artifacts.” (Yanow 2003) This notion of embodiment is also described in Strati’s work, when he writes of the interaction between a human being and a non-human item: “the relationship between the surgeon and the scalpel, […] is such that the scalpel is not considered in itself, but as an integral part of the body.” (Strati 2003, p.65) Strati quotes Polanyi: “we shift outwards the points at which we make contact with the things that we observe as objects outside ourselves. While we rely on a tool or a probe, these are not handled as external objects.” (Polanyi 1962, p.59)





A common feature for several of the practice-based approaches is, that they give importance to the human intention in activity. They describe how physical objects may be the focus of human attention and intention of different sorts. Yanow explicitly writes, that objects are the focus of acts, and that artifacts may be the focus of daily work related practices. Strati uses Polanyis concept of subsidiary awareness to describe how a human action (and intention) leads to temporary interiorization/embodiment. 

The issue of intentionality is very clear in the activity-theoretical approach, where the object of activity (which may be a physical object, but needn’t be) is loaded with intentionality. The object of activity is what activity is directed towards, and which the human subject may work at, for instance by using physical tools. The term object-oriented activity coins this intentional relationship of action.

The perspective which seems to be ‘weakest’ in its conceptualization of the intentions of human subjects is  the sociology of translation., a perspective which commonly faces critique from a humanist perspective – for its not regarding the human subject as ‘anything special’. Sociology of translation does not seem to be preoccupied with human intentions, it instead is interested in tracing effects, in tracing relations and their stabilizations (which often are analyzed with point of departure in a physical object, a stabilized artifact, for instance in Suchmans text, a bridge).

PERFORMANCE, MEDIATION AND ALIGNMENT
Suchman (following Law) views organizing as processes of socio-technical ordering. Ordering (and knowing) is viewed as what Suchman calls ‘persuasive performances’, where the task/challenge is to create stable alignments across human and nonhuman elements. Materials are seen as central to social ordering, but there is no such thing as ‘a natural order of things’. There is no order, but there are ordering efforts, and there is temporary order (Law in Suchman 2003). 

Gherardi and Nicolini, also from a sociology of translation perspective, demonstrate similar conceptualizations of knowing as ‘the performance/ performativity of ordering arrangements’, but Gherardi and Nicolini primarily use the term mediation, and focus on the roles of ‘intermediaries’ (Callon 1992), where intermediaries may be: human beings, artifacts, texts and inscriptions, and money. (Gherardi and Nicolini 2003) “A sociology of translation is a sociology of mediation, since the intermediaries represent delegations and inscriptions of actions already initiated elsewhere: they do not repeat actions but transform these in surprising and unexpected ways.” (Gherardi and Nicolini 2003, p. 210)





intrerpretive aesthetic-meaning-making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-heterogeneous engineering-performance

DOES MATERIALITY 
STABILIZE OR DESTABILIZE DOING?
Materiality may do both. The relationship between materiality as stabilizing or destabilizing may be perceived as one where materiality may stabilize and ‘help actions stay in place’, but may also destabilize in the sense that material objects may help create new action and thus new ways of knowing.

ARTIFACTS MAY CONTRIBUTE WITH ORDER -
PROVIDE POINTS OF ATTENTION
All of the intellectual traditions give room for understanding material objects or artifacts as entities that contribute with order to doing and knowing in practice. Artifacts may stabilize human action because they give focus and thus orient action temporally and spatially (Yanow 2003). 

The material object may be seen as fix-point for activity. Objects may “serve as centering and integrating devices” (Engeström 2003, p.152). Material entities may hold a motivating force, that gives shape and direction to human activity. (Engeström 2003) Human activity is thus connected and related to material artifacts. In this manner material artifacts have a centring effect on human action. They are the objects for meaningful action. 

Artifacts mediate knowing. Knowing takes place through working at and with artifacts (Gherardi & Nicolini 2003). Tools, objects – may be ‘an extension’ of the human body – as the scalpel is to the surgeon (Strati 2003). They become the embodiment of the practice – the object that embodies the mastery of making a flute for example. 

Materiality may participate in stable arrangements, in the performance of order: “Arrangements of social and material elements, aligned well, can be effectively performed as stable artifacts that support the movement of people and goods through time and space. (Suchman 2003, p.201)

These contributions of and to order may include elements of conditioning and control: “The object determines the horizon of possible actions, ” says Engeström (2003, p.152). Material artifacts – with help from disursive activities – may exert control of action (Gherardi & Nicolini 2003, p.215) Inflexible artifacts – objects which are designed in a manner, where their interpretive flexibility is limited, may produce specific effects in user’s practices. (Gherardi & Nicolini p.213) 

Materiality ma contribute with order, and related aspects of control and conditioning, but Suchman and the sociology of translation stress that there is no ‘natural, given order’: Materials “are not given in the natural order of things but are themselves products or effects generated reflexively in and through networks. That is, materials are not simply more and less durable in themselves, but rather some network configurations generate effects that last longer (through their faithful and ongoing reproduction) than others.” (Suchman 2003, p.189)

ORDER IS NOT INHERENT -
STABILIZED MATERIALITY ARE EFFECTS
Materializations may contribute with order. They may “represent, juxtapose, summarize, homogenize, and thus contribute to social order”, but objects are not inherently stable. (Law in Suchmann 2003)

Generally for “many practice-oriented social scientists, incoherencies, inconsistencies, paradoxes and tensions are all fundamental and ineliminable elements of practices.” (Gherardi et.al. 2003) The most explicit stance on this matter comes from the sociology of translation, with its basic scepticism towards ‘natural orders’. Everything is always changing, so stabilizations will always be temporary and (more or less) unstable. An interesting point to study thus emerges: how are heterogeneous materials (humans and non-humans) combined and made durable? Stabilization in this sense becomes an effect of doing. The causal relationship is reversed. Material objects in this perspective are seen as results – as more or less stable effects of ordering activities.

Activity theory inherently has a ‘conflict-based approach’ which supplement the points made by the sociology of translation. Engeström stresses that objects of activity may be ‘unstable mixtures’ and ‘partial manifestations’, they may be ambiguous, they may be expanded and reduced, and they may be disturbance producing (Engeström 2003).

Materialities may malfunction, change, get lost, and break-down (Strati 2006, Latour 2005, Blackler 2003)
Breakdowns and accidents are situations, where materiality very explicitly destabilizes the regular order of doing, and thus generates possibilities for learning and new patterns of activity. This learning aspect  - where learning results from conflicts and change – is stressed by activity theory. Change is perceived as constitutive of practice itself, and learning results from the mutual expansion of the object of work. Within this intellectual tradition stress is put on the creativity and innovation which may emerge out of tension and unease, and these – the tension and unease – may occur because of material matters, because of breakdowns for instance, but also through the introduction of new materialities or technologies. Within the activity theoretical approach unexpected events are viewed as crucial to learning.

There seems to be a fracture line here between distinct approaches to learning. As a contrast to the conflict-based activity theory may be taken Yanow’s interpretive case study of flute-makers (Yanow 2003). In this analysis, Yanow stresses the enculturation and homogenizing aspects of learning: the transmission of a legacy and a shared repertoire. This goes for the interaction with materiality too: learning to handle the tools, learning to feel the flute-in-making. The power of tradition is stressed.

Summing up, the relationships between materiality, doing, order and conflict or change are complex and are viewed as such. These practice-based approaches to organizational knowing show that material artifacts and objects play crucial parts as ‘stabilizers’ – they stabilize action, give it something to evolve around, and to engage in activity with, and they give meaning to action. At the same time material objects and entities may ‘destabilize’, they may play crucial roles in change, they may breakdown, get lost and mal-function. Or they may even just be new and thus demand new forms of doing – new practices. Material objects and artifacts may order and fixate action, but they may also make practice move in new ways.

A RICH LANGUAGE FOR PROCESSES, A POORER ONE FOR OBJECTS
The cross-reading of the practice-based contributions provides an understanding of some of the central concepts which are used to understand materiality and its interaction with doing in practice. The terms used vary – central terms being objects and artifacts, but important terms also being actant and object of activity.

They all agree on the importance of looking at material mediation if we want to understand practice, but they build this material mediation into distinct figures or metaphors: some focus on the human interpretation of materiality; others focus on objects as the point where the human consciousness and the outer, material world meet, and still others look at material objects as network effects. Several proces-terms are offered to help understand how doing and knowing in practice are materially mediated: embodiment, symbolization, object-oriented activity, alignment and - mediation.

Within an interpretive-aesthetic understanding, there is tendency to talk about materiality as artifacts, and to understand the relationship between materiality and doing in terms of embodiment and symbolization. Within a activity theoretical approach the central concept is object of activity. Human activity is always directed towards an object and this object-oriented activity is central to learning and knowing. Sociology of translation is the tradition which is most explicitly renowned for its focus on material entities. Stable artifacts are viewed as network effects and central process-words are alignment, mediation and translation.

Stabilization or destabilization? All of the approaches view materiality as something which may stabilize doing in practice. Material objects very often are fix-points, they are ‘the center of attention’, they are the texture that activities of work weave at. And most of them also acknowledge that materiality in deed may also destabilize doing – and thus intentionally or by accident create learning occasions and new practices.





Alvesson 2002: Mats Alvesson: Postmodernism and Social Research, Open University Press 2002

Blackler 1995: Frank Blackler: Knowledge, Knowledge Work and Organizations: An Overview and Interpretation in The Journal of Organisation Studies, 16(6)

Blackler 2003: Frank Blackler, Norman Crump and Seonaidh McDonald: Organizing Processes in Complec Activity Networks in Gherardi et.al. 2003

Dugdale, Anni: Materiality; juggling sameness and difference, in Actor Network Theory and after, eds.: John Law and John Hassard, Blackwell Publishers/The Editorial Board of the Sociological Review 1999

Engeström 2003: Yrjo Engeström. Anne Puoni and Laura Seppänen: Spatial and Temporal Expansion of the Object as a Challenge for Reorganizing Work in Gherardi et.al. 2003

Fuglsang 2005: Fuglsang, Lars & P.B.Olsen: Videnskabsteori i samfundsvidenskaberne, Roskilde Universitetsforlag 2005

Gagliardi 1990: Pascale Gagliardi: Symbols and Artifacts: Views of the Corporate Landscape, Walter de Gruyter, 1990

Gagliardi 1996: Pascale Gagliardi: Exploring the Aesthetic Side of Organizational Life, pp. 565-580 in Clegg, Hardy and Nord: Handbook of Organization Studies, Sage 1996

Gherardi et al. 2003: Nicolini, Gherardi & Yanow: Knowing in Organizations. A Practice-Based Approach. M.E. Sharpe, 2003

Gherardi & Nicolini 2003: To Transfer is to Transform: The Circulation of Safety Knowledge in Gherardi et.al. 2003

Jensen, Torben Elgaard: Aktør-Netværksteori – en sociologi om kendsgerninger, karakker og kammuslinger, Papers in Organization no. 48 - 2003, New Social Science Monographs, 2003

Law 1999: John Law and John Hussard: Actor Network Theory and After. Blackwell Publishers 1999

Law 2004: John Law: After Method, Mess in social science research, Routledge 2004

Latour 1992: Where are the missing masses? Sociology of a few mundane artifacts. In W. Bijker & J.Law: Shaping technology – building society: Studies in sociotechnical change, MIT Press 1992

Latour 2005: Latour, Bruno: Reassembling the Social: an introduction to actor-network-theory, Clarendon Lectures in Management Studies. Oxford University Press 2005

Miller 2005: Daniel Miller (ed.) Materiality, Duke University Press 2005

Pels, Hetherington & Vandenberghe 2002: Dick Pels, Kevin Hetherington and Frédéric Vandenberghe: Sociality/materiality : the status of the object in social science, Special Issue of  “Theory, culture & society”, 19:5/6, SAGE 2002

Pratt & Rafaeli 1997: Michael G. Pratt and Anat Rafaeli: Organizational Dress as a Symbol of Multilayered Social Identities, Academy of Management Journal, vol. 40 (1997), pp. 862-98

Pratt & Rafaeli 2001: Michael G. Pratt and Anat Rafaeli: Symbols as a Language of Organizational Relationships, Research in Organizational Behavior, Volume 23, pages 93-132, 2001 (article)

Pratt & Rafaeli 2006: Michael G. Pratt and Anat Rafaeli (eds.): Artifacts and Organizations – Beyond Mere Symbolism, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers

Spender 1996: Making Knowledge the Basis of a Dynamic Theory of the Firm. Strategic Management Journal, 17 (Winter Special Issue)

Strati 1999: Antonio Strati: Organization and aesthetics. Sage 1999

Strati 2003: Antonio Strati: Knowing in Practice: Aesthetic Understanding and Tacit Knowledge in Gherardi 2003 

Strati 2006: Antonio Strati: Organizational Artifacts and the Aesthetic Approach in Pratt & Rafaeli 2006

Suchman 2003: Lucy Suchman: Organizing Alignment: The Case of Bridge-Building in Gherardi et.al. 2003

Yanow 2003: Dvora Yanow: Seeing Organizational Learning: A “Cultural” View in Gherardi 2003

Yanow 2006: Dvora Yanow: Studying Physical Artifacts: An Interpretive Approach in Pratt & Rafaeli 2006








^1	  For differences between action and activity see Blackler 2003
^2	  For a further discussion of ‘commodity’-approaches to knowledge see Gherardi et.al. 2003, p.6
^3	  This may be explored further elsewhere - what are differences and similarities within the approaches as regards ‘situatedness’? “The term ‘situated’ indicates that knowledge and its subjects and objects must be understood as produced together within a temporally, geographically, or relationally situated practice.” This is not without importance to ‘materiality’.
^4	  Context, historicity and situatedness are also relevant to examine, but this is beyond the scope of this text.
^5	  A remark – within activity theory the concept is ‘object of activity’, and this like artifact may be both material, immaterial and a combination of both.
^6	  These various artifactual forms are the data that are accessed and analyzed using interpretive methods. “Such a cultural methodological approach gives as much emphasis to physical artifacts as to acts and language (see, e.g. Gagliardi 1990b; Yanow 1996, esp. ch. 6) (Yanow 2006, p.37)
^7	  In the texts, which this presentation is based on.
^8	  Following from this approach, our understanding of things will always be epistemic, and therefore, attempts at ontologically characterizing them are irrelevant.
^9	  a.k.a. actor-network-theory, relational materialism, semiotic materialism
^10	  (at least for this reader)
^11	  I agree, that no ‘meanings’ per se, reside ‘in the things themselves’, but could it be, that something else, resides in them? That they may be loaded with certain ‘scripts’, ‘agentive effects’?
